Forward: Financing the Cost of Enforcing Legal Rights by Tunney, John V.
FOREWORD
FINANCING THE COST OF ENFORCING
LEGAL RIGHTS
JOHN V. TUNNEYt
In recent years, both the nature and number of rights given
to the average citizen have changed. We have more laws; they
are more complex; they deal less with traditional property dis-
putes and more with the environment, job safety, medical care,
consumer protection, retirement, disability, and other aspects of
our personal lives. Because these new rights intimately affect all
Americans, unlike the traditional property rights which affected
only property owners, the need for representation of all citizens
has increased.
While the need for representation has increased with regard
to all the citizenry, the ability of an individual to meet the rising
price tag on legal services is not as widely shared. The end result
of this dichotomy is that there are many important rights of
citizens theoretically guaranteed by law which go unenforced
and unvindicated because of the high cost of legal representa-
tion. Strains have been placed on all the institutions in our
society because Congress and the courts have too often focused
only on defining substantive rights and have not been concerned
with financing and lowering the cost of, or creating other incen-
tives for, their enforcement.
There are many ways to reduce the cost of legal services.
Increasing competition among lawyers by liberalizing the restric-
tions on advertising and solicitation, introducing specialization
and mechanization into legal work, and deploying paralegal
personnel are but a few. "Self-help" mechanisms such as small
claims court and arbitration, subjects of a bill I have introduced,'
are still others. But there can be no doubt that the cost of
litigation will remain an insurmountable obstacle to many
Americans in their attempts to enforce important statutory and
Constitutional rights. Methods need to be developed to shift or
spread the cost of litigation if these rights are to be vindicated.
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In the United States, unlike most other judicial systems in
the world, win or lose, litigants ordinarily bear the expense of
their own attorneys. Some devices do exist to shift part of that
cost to others. Business litigants may share the cost of their
litigation with the general taxpayer by deducting attorney's fees
from taxable income as an ordinary and necessary business
expense. The poor may also shift their attorney's fees to the
general taxpayer by using, where available, OEO-funded Legal
Services attorneys. Taxpayers also help to subsidize litigation
undertaken by law firms funded through tax-exempt founda-
tions. Three other litigation financing devices, with less govern-
mental involvement, are membership funded organizations such
as the Sierra Club, class actions which spread litigation expenses
among the beneficiaries of the law suit, and group and prepaid
insurance plans.2 These devices are uncertain, unstable, or lim-
ited in scope, and fail to involve large segments of the citizenry
and the private bar. Taken together, they fail to deal adequately
with the need for legal services.
Another promising method of financing access to courts is
through attorney's fee awards to be paid by a party to the
litigation, or by someone else within the court's jurisdiction. Such
awards are often called "fee-shifting." The Comment which
follows explores whether the American Rule preventing such fee
shifting promotes the most effective enforcement of important
substantive rights and the most equitable distribution of the costs
of litigation.
Greater congressional attention to the development of fee
shifting is warranted. During the Johnson years with the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress stimulated this de-
velopment. Now twenty-nine federal statutes authorize courts to
shift fees. The courts have begun to interpret this arthorization
broadly to encourage individuals to vindicate rights. 3 But con-
gressional inattention to financing the enforcement of rights in
other areas has left the courts to grapple with their authority to
use fee shifting absent explicit statutory authorization.
In my view, congressional silence in these matters is merely a
by-product of the legislative process and not a conscious signal to
the courts of any kind. The question of attorney's fees often fails
2 With the passage of Pub. L. No. 93-95 (Aug. 15, 1973) amending § 302(c) of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1970),
to make group and prepaid legal insurance programs a subject of collective bargaining,
these plans are expected to proliferate as did health insurance programs.3 See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
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to surface during a legislative debate because the focus of con-
cern is on other issues in the legislation. Recognizing this, the
courts have nearly unanimously concluded that congressional
silence does not bar fee shifting.4
Consistent with the notion that federal courts have, implicit
in their jurisdictional grants, power to fashion remedies "neces-
sary to effectuate the Congressional policy underpinning the
substantive provisions of [a] statute' 5 the notion of fee shifting
proliferated without specific congressional authorization. This
has been done in areas ranging from buying a home
6 to privacy7
to union elections,8 and to many other areas affecting the per-
sonal lives of Americans. This judicial activity has raised several
issues which suggest the need for further legislative initiatives.
On October 4 and 5, 1973, the Senate Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on Representation of Citizen Interests, of which I am chair-
man, held hearings on fee shifting as part of a series of hearings
on legal fees. While these hearings showed the great promise of
this device for increasing citizen redress, and rectifying an im-
balance in our adversary system, they also highlighted the need
for legislative reform to ensure uniformity and consistency in
application. The Subcommittee is presently exploring com-
prehensive legislative proposals to determine when fees should
be awarded, how large the award should be, who should be
eligible for an award, and who should have immunity from the
imposition of an award.
The ensuing discussion will consider four aspects of the
attorney's fees problem that are of special importance today: the
plight of the private litigant with a private claim, the award of
attorney's fees in "public interest" litigation, the award of fees to
Community Legal Services organizations, and the size of the fee
awarded. These areas were chosen because they encompass the
two most pressing problems of equalizing court access: the situa-
tion of the poor or middle class litigant with a valid claim, but
unable to pay an attorney's fee directly; and the situation of the
private citizen wishing to litigate claims that involve issues of
public policy with broad societal ramifications, who is unable to
obtain adequate representation. In each of these areas the in-
4 See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
5 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)); see Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (1973).
6 See Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
' See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (1973).
8 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
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quiry centers on the courts' handling of the attorney's fees
problem in the past, and the future ability of the fee award to
enhance access to the courts. Often suggestions for legislative
reforms are made. Some reforms I agree with; others I do not.
All are worthy of consideration.
As demonstrated by Subcommittee investigations to date,
economics is the key to representation both in terms of what
consumers can afford to pay and what lawyers can afford to
accept. Fee shifting holds out great promise to both providers
and consumers of legal services as a device for financing the
enforcement of legal rights and closing the gap in the represen-
tation of citizen interests.
